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CHANGING

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1. In June 1951, the Ministerium fuer Post und Fernmeldewesen (Ministry for Post and Telegraph) (MPF) was authorized by the Signal Department of the Soviet Control Commission, Berlin-Karlshorst, to assign call signals to the commercial radio stations under its administration. Call signals were assigned as follows:

<u>Frequency</u> <u>kcs</u>	<u>Call</u> <u>Sign</u>	<u>Frequency</u> <u>kcs</u>	<u>Call</u> <u>Sign</u>
17520	DKA	7437.5	DKJ
13695	DKB	6714	DKK
11967	DKC	5800	DKL
11440	DKD	5335	DKM
10210	DKE	5255	DKN
9390	DKF	4010	DKO
7217.5	DKG	3395	DKP
7380	DKH	69.7	DKQ
7784	DKI		

2. In July 1951, technical work on the Berlin-Prague and Berlin-Peiping radio links was completed and trial operations were concluded. Frequencies of 3375 and 6975 kcs were used for the connection with Prague. For communications with Peiping the following frequencies and call signs were used:

9067 kes - DLA
7537 " - DLA 2
16353 " - DLA 3
17395 " - DLA 4
19443 " - DLA 5.

From these frequencies the frequency most suitable for the season and the time of the day was selected. The radio links will be put into operation after approval of these

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frequencies by the SOU.

3. In July 1951, the radio station in Moscow was still under construction.
4. Trial operations were hampered by the poor efficiency of radio operators assigned to the Foreign Ministry and the various diplomatic missions. The output of the 1.2 kw transmitter in Koenigswusterhausen used for these trial operations and controlled from the Foreign Ministry was not always adequate for satisfactory communications between Berlin and Peking.

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